Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice
8
take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection" 8 , with this later clarified to mean "freedom from those factors and conditions that we independently know effectively prevent minimal self-understanding".
9 Such a condition allows for there to be interruptions to autonomy that are not mitigated by the reflective endorsement of the individual.
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Perhaps because such conditions play a largely subsidiary role in Christman's theory, they
are not spelled out in detail. While he gives some examples of relevant factors (uncontrollable rage, hallucinogenic drugs, lack of minimal education), he also alludes more broadly to 'manipulation'. However, he offers no further explanation as to what is to be considered a case of manipulation. Not only do we not know whether Meredith would count as manipulated, more importantly we do not know what additional information we would need to make that determination. While Christman's theory is promising, it does not yet ask the right questions about an agent such as Meredith.
I have suggested that the key problem with Christman's theory is not his inclusion of a historical version of reflective endorsement, as is commonly thought, but rather that this condition is insufficient to determine the autonomy of an agent. Something more is needed to make that determination. I will offer my own suggestions for additional conditions in Section Three. Before doing so, however, it will be useful to examine alternative solutions to the problems raised by Christman's theory. First, I consider a theory that may be thought 8 Christman, 'Autonomy and Personal History', p.11. 9 Christman, The Politics of Persons, p.147. 10 It is admittedly somewhat difficult to see how this can be reconciled with Christman's earlier claim that there are no external and objective criteria for autonomy: "Imagine any process which you stipulate as resulting in the subversion of autonomy, and I can imagine a person who (given a fantastical enough hypothetical situation) would want her choices formed that way, and this desire is itself an autonomous one". 'Autonomy and Personal History', p.21.
to address the very problem Christman's supplementary criteria are aiming at, namely to identify processes of desire formation that are objectively incompatible with autonomy.
Such a theory has been developed by Al Mele, and it is to that theory that I now turn.
2b. Historical Conditions
At the centre of Mele's theory of autonomy is a hypothetical counter-example to procedural theories (i.e. those theories which only consider the structure of an agent's dispositions and are thus purely concerned with the 'internal' profile of the individual's psychology). Mele's solution is to appeal to an external, historical, criterion: for an agent to be autonomous with respect to a pro-attitude P, it must not be the case that P is compelled*.
'Compulsion*' differs from 'compulsion' for Mele in that, by definition, 'compulsion*' Mele, refers to a process in which a pro-attitude is instilled in an agent through a process which bypasses the agent's capacities for self-control, and results in a pro-attitude the agent is practically unable to shed. More precisely, compulsion* identifies situations in which an agent (i) comes to have a pro-attitude because of an external force, rather than via the exercise of her skills for critical reflection and evaluative judgment; and (ii) the instilled proattitude is one she is unable (in the absence of radical counterfactuals) to eradicate or attenuate; and (iii) she did not arrange the bypassing herself; and (iv) she does not, nor did she earlier, possess other pro-attitudes that would support her endorsing the instilled proattitude (unless those endorsing pro-attitudes were themselves compelled*).
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There is an immediate and decisive problem with utilising Mele's condition as a guide for identifying autonomy-inhibiting socialisation: it would rule out much of early childhood education, including education directed at developing the very capacities necessary for autonomy. 13 According to Mele, the possession of a pro-attitude is compelled* if its acquisition by-passes capacities for self-control. If the relevant capacities are inoperative or not yet developed, as they will be in very young children, Mele takes them to have been bypassed. 14 Mele observes in passing that such by-passing will be common in young children, but notes that this is not sufficient for compulsion* unless the pro-attitude is also practically childhood is a case of religious indoctrination, where the child develops deep-seated religious beliefs that cannot be shaken due to the parent's graphic portrayals of the Hellish fate of those who question the existence of God. In such a case, the child's abilities to assess and believe on the basis of evidence are circumvented -these abilities are not utilised in the adoption or retention of her religious beliefs.
While I agree with Mele's diagnosis that this example should count as autonomy-inhibiting socialisation, my concern is with how wide Mele's net will need to be cast. Many of us have pro-attitudes that we are practically unable to shed, and that can be traced to early childhood socialisation: our love for our parents; our trust in scientific and mathematic proof; our respect for the needs of others. While some of these may be innate, others are more plausibly thought of as the product of socialisation. Of most relevance here is the fact that attitudes towards reasons, evidence, and reflection are both practically unsheddable and presumably inculcated. They are unsheddable -as Mele understands that termbecause they are fully integrated into our broader attitudes towards ourselves and the world around us. An individual who has internalised the minimal demands of rationality in decision-making, for instance, will be no more able to shed that attitude than a parent can shed her love for her children. While some external event may precipitate such shedding (we might imagine some kind of spiritual epiphany, perhaps), the agent cannot bring such an event on herself. She is, in Mele's terms, 'stuck with the values'.
The problem here is that one of the central roles of socialisation is to inculcate the very proattitudes that are required for the kind of self-control Mele sees as necessary for autonomy. 15 To be self-controlled is to believe and desire on the basis of an assessment of evidence. This will rely upon having the appropriate pro-attitudes towards evidence and reasons, which must at some point have been instilled in the child. While it may be the case that the child will later come to endorse those evidentiary pro-attitudes, they will still count as compelled* on Mele's account because the later process of endorsement must rely on pro-attitudes that were themselves compelled*. To explain: Mele provides something of an 'escape clause' for early-childhood socialisation in the fourth clause of his definition of compulsion* outlined above, namely that the compelled* pro-attitude are not endorsed by other non-compelled pro-attitudes. This may be thought to lead to the conclusion that the pro-attitudes necessary for autonomy are not compelled, because they could have been endorsed by the maturing child. However, the process of endorsement itself relies on certain attitudes towards belief and evidence, which must at some point have been inculcated in the not-yet-reasoning child, and must thus count as compelled*.
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The kind of self-control that Mele sees as necessary for autonomy has to be cultivated, and one of the key ways it is cultivated is through a process of socialisation that instils proattitudes towards reasons and beliefs in children, before they are yet able to reason and believe on the basis of evidence (indeed, the whole point is to enable children to reason and believe on the basis of evidence). We can see this problem at work if we return to the case of Julie. For argument's sake, let's imagine that Julie acts on the basis of her commitment to the claim that a woman's worth is not determined by her physical appearance. This is a commitment that her parents took great care to instil in her when she was too young to reflect on it on the basis of evidence. Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in Stoljar's paper as to whether the problem is exclusively with the falsity of these women's beliefs, or rather includes their oppressiveness.
For instance, in describing the shifting intuitions she predicts towards the attribution of autonomy in smokers, Stoljar points out that "when smokers *...+ do opt to smoke on the basis of false and oppressive norms [...] the intuition that they are not autonomous is triggered." Likewise, she explains the intuition that Luker's pregnant subjects are not autonomous on the grounds that "the internalized norms motivating the decision to take a contraceptive risk have criticizable content".
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Although it is unclear whether the problematic beliefs must be both false and oppressive, or if either conjunct is sufficient, the distinction is negligible for my purposes. 22 When applied to our two cases it seems that on either interpretation, Stoljar's theory would account for our intuitions. Plausibly, Julie is acting on the basis of true and non-oppressive norms.
Equally plausibly, Meredith is acting on the basis of false and oppressive norms. One of the benefits of Stoljar's theory, moreover, is that it does not necessitate the conclusion that Meredith's decision was non-autonomous. It is at least conceptually possible (though admittedly unlikely) that Meredith's decision could be motivated by norms that are neither false nor oppressive. By appealing to the reasons behind a decision, Stoljar's theory does not, contrary to the worries of many of her critics, pre-emptively rule out certain decisions or life-style choices as non-autonomous. What Stoljar's theory is missing is an analysis of autonomy that explains how the belief in question undercuts autonomy, which in turn requires specification of some feature of autonomy that the belief can undercut. Once more, a theory of autonomy that promised to resolve the problem of socialisation has fallen short. In this case, we can attribute the failure to Stoljar's reductive strategy: if autonomy simply reduces to being free of oppressive socialisation, then it cannot provide a principled explanation as to how such socialisation undermines autonomy.
2.d The Authoritative Stance
The final view to consider is that put forward, in subtly different forms, by both Andrea
Westlund and Paul Benson. Westlund and Benson maintain that autonomy is not to be understood as a structural feature of the agent's psychology, nor in terms of the agent's history. Rather, autonomy is constituted by a particular kind of disposition: a disposition of responsiveness to normative pressure, which expresses itself through a willingness to stand behind, or speak for, one's actions.
According to Westlund, if an individual is unwilling or unable to give reasons in defence of her choices or actions, she fails to be autonomous. As she puts it, "Readiness to answer for oneself is, on this view, no mere sign that one is self-governing with respect to one's relevant practical reasoning. reference to her unshakeable belief that women should not mutilate their bodies, and is unwilling or unable to engage with further challenges to that commitment, she must be considered non-autonomous. The more committed she is to that stance, the more it forms an authentic part of her self-understanding, the less Westlund's account will deem her autonomous. Such a counter-intuitive conclusion raises grave doubts about Westlund's account.
Nonetheless, a very similar account may have the resources to fare better. Benson has developed a view that is structurally related to Westlund's. 27 He, too, holds autonomy to be constituted by a self-regarding attitude that expresses itself in a willingness to take responsibility for one's actions. However, for Benson that willingness is disconnected from the giving of reasons for our actions, and instead focuses on the act of claiming authority for our actions. Claiming authority involves standing behind, and speaking for, actions that we have performed. Since Benson accepts that we can claim authority even for actions that are trivial, or over which we are deeply ambivalent, we presumably do not need to be willing to
engage in an open-ended justificatory dialogue. Our authority is claimed when we answer for the action, not when we have attempted to justify the action. In other words, it seems that on Benson's account it should be sufficient merely to claim 'because I wanted to' in response to an interlocutor. Claiming the action as one's own, and expressing one's willingness to stand responsible for it, is (at least part of) what constitutes autonomy.
While Benson's variation promises to overcome the limitation of Westlund's view explored above, it is still faced with a formidable obstacle. The problem for Benson -and for
Westlund too, it should be noted -is that individuals can be willing to stand behind actions even when these actions are paradigmatically non-autonomous. This can best be illuminated through Albert Moll's famous study of hypnosis. Moll relates the following anecdote:
I tell a hypnotized subject that when he wakes he is to take a flower-pot from the window, wrap it in a cloth, put it on a sofa, and bow to it three times. All which he does. When he is asked for his reasons he answers, 'You know, when I woke and saw the flower-pot there I thought that as it was rather cold the flower-pot had better be warmed a little, or else the plant would die. So I wrapped it in the cloth, and then I thought that as the sofa was near the fire I would put the flower-pot on it; and I bowed because I was pleased with think that the answers to these questions will make reference to any facet of the claiming of authority, suggesting that this phenomenon is in fact peripheral to the concept of autonomy.
What appeal there is in Benson's theory perhaps reflects the fact that such attitudes are commonly correlated to autonomy. In the concluding section I suggest some factors which may explain the at least partial reliability of Benson's theory as a determinant of autonomy, but also explain why his theory is not directly tracking autonomy. 30 Benson, 'Taking Ownership', p.118.
3: An Alternative Framework
We have now examined four starkly different theories of autonomy, each of which attempts to resolve the problem of socialisation, and each of which falls short. This may leave us feeling somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of solving this problem. What is required, to recap, is a theory which can lay out the necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy, and in doing so show how some forms of socialisation support those conditions, while others compromise them.
In the remainder of this paper I will sketch an answer to the initial question of what autonomy is, and then suggest some ways certain forms of socialisation may compromise it.
I argue for an understanding of autonomy as comprised of five conceptually distinct dimensions, each of which can be measured according to the extent it facilitates the realisation of the agent's will in a given action. 31 This is not presented as a conclusive and comprehensive theory, but rather a starting point which provides sufficient content to enable the differentiation of autonomy-supporting and autonomy-compromising socialisation. I conclude by assessing how successfully my account can overcome the problems faced by the four theories outlined above.
3a. The Dimensions of Autonomy
To be autonomous is to be self-governed, it is to be in control of one's interactions with the world, and it is to have those interactions correspond to one's self. Paradigmatically autonomous action, than, can be said to involve 'realising one's will in the world'. I suggest that this can best be understood in terms of an idealised three-step decision-making process: first, comprehension of the prospective action; second, critical reflection on whether to undertake the action; and third, resolution in intentional action. So for
Meredith's act of getting breast implants to be ideally autonomous, she would need to comprehend what breast implants were; she would need to reflect on whether this act was in accordance with her values, commitments and desires; and this reflection would need to be resolved through the formation and execution of an intention to get breast implants.
These steps are mutually interdependent, in the sense that we cannot resolve to act without first reflecting on the act, and we can do neither without first comprehending the existence of the prospective action. From this idealised three step process it is possible to discern five distinct dimensions of autonomy, each of which affects the degree to which a given action is autonomous.
There are two crucial caveats that must be stressed before this schema is explored in more detail. First, it would be a mistake to assume a thoroughly intellectualised theory of the decision-making process. With these caveats in mind, it is time to identify the five dimensions that I claim constitute autonomy, and which are discernable through reference to the three-stage process of comprehension, reflection, and resolution. It is important to bear in mind that each of these dimensions can be achieved to a greater or lesser extent. My claim is simply that, all else being equal, increasing the level of any of these dimensions will augment the agent's autonomy with respect to the action at hand, and conversely, lowering the level of any of these dimensions will diminish the agent's autonomy.
Knowledge of the World
Information affects the degree to which an action can be autonomous. If an agent has false beliefs about the act that she is performing, then her autonomy is compromised. 35 This can be seen with a basic example: Sally believes the liquid in the mug in front of her is coffee. Since she wants to stay awake to finish the paper 34 Though there is not space to fully defend the point here, I also reject the idea that there is some point on the scale at which the agent becomes 'fully' or 'properly' autonomous. More plausible, I believe, is the claim that the purposes to which we put autonomy (i.e. as the basis for moral respect, or as a counter to paternalism) each appeals to a different level of autonomy. For further discussion, see (...) 35 See Mele, Autonomous Agents, pp.179-182. I defend and extend Mele's position in (...)
she is working on, she decides to drink it. Unbeknownst to her, the liquid is actually decaf, to which she has a strong and principled aversion. Since Sally's reasons for action do not map onto the action she performs, the action is less autonomous than it would have been if her information had been correct. Incorrect information reverberates through the decision-making process, undermining reflection (the agent reflects on an irrelevant, unavailable act) and resolution (the act she intends to perform is not the one she does perform). Extrapolating from this, we can say that the more correct and relevant information the agent has about the action she is contemplating performing, including the effects that will follow from that action, the more autonomous the action will be. 
Self-Knowledge
If paradigmatically autonomous action is action that corresponds to the agent's self, then the agent is going to be more autonomous to the extent that she knows herself. More precisely, an agent's autonomy will be augmented to the extent that she knows what her motivational attitudes are (i.e. her desires, values, commitments and plans), and to the extent that she knows how she ranks those attitudes. Self-knowledge enables an agent to bring her actions into alignment with her motivational attitudes. desires. This would enable the agent to critically reflect on the validity of her endorsement -while she may still find herself feeling positively about hypnosis, she would be able to access reasons not to endorse that feeling.
Self-Definition

Internal Self-Realisation
The dimensions outlined above correspond to the first two of the three-step process identified at the outset of this section, namely comprehension and reflection. Since autonomy refers to self-governance, and not merely self-analysis, the process thus far is still insufficient to fully capture the meaning of autonomy. If an agent reflects endlessly, without that reflection terminating in the formation of an intention, she has fallen short of the goal of realising her will in the world. In light of this, I propose that autonomy is augmented to the extent that the agent forms an intention that responds to and reflects her motivational set. Failure to form an intention, forming an intention that does not accurately reflect the agent's motivational set, or forming an intention that only accidentally reflects the agent's motivational set, will each indicate a reduction in the agent's autonomy.
External Self-Realisation
The final dimension of autonomy is one that is commonly overlooked. Since much philosophical focus tends to be on the authenticity of the agent's motivational attitudes, scant attention is paid to what happens once the agent's intention has been formed. As such, this dimensions requires a little more in the way of motivation than some of the above dimensions. Self-governance must surely be taken to mean both governance by the self, and governance of the self. While concern with the former explains the focus on authenticity, concern with the latter should extend this focus to include the agent's navigation of a path through life. If the agent's authentic values and desires can't be implemented in action, then it is hard to see how she is governing herself at all. To borrow the common analogy of captaining a ship, it would be as if the captain were busily plotting a course and issuing orders, and all the while the ship remained moored to the dock.
It is thus worth noting that if an agent's intention 'misfires', then it is odd to say that her autonomy is unscathed. 36 For instance, let's return to Sally and her cup of coffee. Sally intends to drink the (now correctly identified) coffee. However, when she tries to reach out her arm to grasp the cup, she finds that instead her arm flails wildly above her head. Even though the intention was formed in just the right way, in accordance with motivational attitudes that were correctly identified and endorsed in light of their history, Sally's autonomy cannot be considered unimpaired. This dimension thus tracks the extent to which the action that is performed corresponds to the intention that was formed. The highest level of this dimension will be achieved when an action successfully realises the precise intention; the lowest level reflects the absence of any action corresponding to the intention; and in between will be those actions that only partially or inaccurately realise the intention.
3b. Autonomy-Compromising Socialisation
With a sketch of our conceptual account in hand, the key question that remains is: what forms of socialisation compromise autonomy? In this section I will not attempt to 36 Amongst those who would reject such reasoning is Michael McKenna, who explicitly states that "*autonomy's+ scope comes to an end at the moment in which an agent performs simple mental actions, such as deciding or choosing". So what kinds of socialisation would compromise knowledge-of-the-world, as that dimension contributes to the phenomenon of autonomy? There are two directions from which this question can be approached. First, consideration must be given to forms of socialisation that directly instil false beliefs in a certain domain, and thus compromise autonomy in that domain. Second, consideration must also be given to forms of socialisation that undermine the background psychological conditions that facilitate the development and utilisation of knowledge-of-the-world.
In terms of the first dimension, it will be useful to start with a relatively non-controversial example. We could imagine, for instance, a cult that indoctrinated its members to believe 
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The next question we must ask is whether socialisation could compromise autonomy, and in particular the dimension of knowledge-of-the-world, indirectly. An important attitude worth considering in this context is trust, both with respect to oneself and to appropriate others. To see why this is so, we must first briefly consider the nature of trust. For an agent to have an attitude of trust towards another individual involves two distinct assessments:
first, that the trusted party is competent relevant to the entrusted activity, and second that the trusted party regards the agent with benevolence. 38 For instance, I trust someone to catch me if I assess that they are sufficiently strong and co-ordinated to do so (competence), and in addition I assess that they will not deliberately drop me (benevolence). Self-trust requires that an agent take herself to be competent in the relevant domain, and in addition believe that she will not self-sabotage.
It should not be controversial to observe that certain forms of socialisation can effectively undermine trust, both towards oneself and towards others. All that is required is that individuals are taught to believe themselves or others to be either incompetent in the relevant domain, or malevolently motivated. Forms of socialisation that position certain social groups as irrational, or childlike, or malevolent, will decrease the likelihood of individuals trusting members of those groups. When the agent herself is a member of the targeted group, her trust in herself will likewise tend to be compromised.
This raises the question of whether lack of trust -either in oneself or in relevant otherscould compromise knowledge-of-the-world. I believe it could. It is important to recall that knowledge in and of itself is insufficient -this dimension is relevant to autonomy insofar as the agent is able to put that knowledge to use in her reflection and resolution. Crucially, this requires self-trust. Benson's observations regarding the process of Gaslighting, though intended for a slightly different purpose, can be informative here. 39 If an individual believes herself to be delusional, failing to trust either her own perceptions or her rationality, then she is unable to use the information she is receiving to reflect on her prospective action. In the absence of self-trust, the necessary connection between comprehension and reflection is disrupted. As such, if a form of socialisation teaches individuals that they lack rationality in a certain domain, or are inclined towards false perceptions, then the resulting lack of epistemic trust will undermine the role that knowledge-of-the-world plays in autonomy. 40 Less commonly discussed, at least in the context of autonomy, is the importance of trust in relevant others. Knowledge-of-the-world depends upon access to reliable information.
While some of that information may be obtainable through first-person observation, it is widely recognised that knowledge largely depends upon testimony. 41 At least in some domains, autonomous action will depend upon trusting those who are able to provide us with the information needed for adequate reflection and resolution. An (admittedly not unproblematic) example can be seen in the domain of medical decisions. According to my theory, an decision regarding a particular medical treatment would be more autonomous the greater the understanding of what that treatment involved. This is information that can only plausibly be obtained by trusting those with greater knowledge of the treatment in question. If an individual were socialised to distrust all medical professionals, say, it would be very difficult for her to autonomously choose how to respond to an illness. 42 As such, some forms of socialisation can diminish autonomy by inculcating attitudes of distrust towards those whose knowledge is necessary for informed critical reflection.
Putting the Theory to the Test
I have claimed that the five-dimensional model outlined above would be more successful in analysing the autonomy of Julie and Meredith than the four theories criticised above. It is time to put that claim to the test. What, then, would the theory say about Julie and
Meredith? The first thing to note is that it would resist attempts to classify either woman as either autonomous or non-autonomous, and would instead lend itself to assessing the degree to which each is autonomous, in the given scenario. This would be determined in accordance with the five dimensions: knowledge-of-the-world; self-knowledge; selfdefinition; internal self-realisation; and external self-realisation. Since each scenario will present a different pattern across these dimensions, it allows for a nuanced analysis of precisely how each agent's autonomy may be compromised in the given situation.
As noted at the outset, one of the desiderata for a theory of autonomy is that it ask the right questions when confronted with an agent like Meredith: what more would need to be known in order to make an assessment of her autonomy? The five-dimensional model gives a clear answer. We would need to know whether there were any factual errors in her understanding of the operation she was contemplating; we would need to know whether she understood her own desires, values, commitments and plans; we would need to know whether those desires, values, commitments and plans were ones she would endorse in full knowledge of their history and of relevant external facts; we would need to know whether her intention to get the breast implants accurately responded to and reflected those desires, values, commitments and plans; and we would need to know whether the operation she underwent accurately reflected the intention that she had formed.
Admittedly, in most cases gaining access to this information will be epistemically challenging, to say the least. Nonetheless, it is no slight on a theory of autonomy that it does not give easy answers to the question of how we make determinations of autonomy.
How does the theory I have presented here compare to the theories examined in Section Two? Unlike Christman's theory, my theory would not pin the determination of Meredith's autonomy merely on her lack of alienation from desires induced by patriarchal socialisation.
It requires further that she would endorse her desire, in the additional light of full knowledge of relevant facts about the world. In this case, this would include knowledge of the history of patriarchy, and the effect it tends to have on women raised in it. It is only if the endorsement would persist in light of this knowledge that it would signal high levels of autonomy. Moreover, it would look beyond endorsement to ensure that Meredith understood the implications of her surgery, and that the act of undertaking surgery was in line with the intention that followed form her reflection. It thus places more stringent requirements on an agent like Meredith, without going so far as to say that her autonomy was inevitably compromised because of the content of her action.
Next I examined Mele's historical theory of autonomy. The problem here was his definition of compulsion*, which resulted in individuals being deemed non-autonomous merely for being inculcated as children with the beliefs necessary for critical reflection. I argued that the inculcation of a belief in childhood, which then becomes unsheddable, cannot be enough on its own to generate a diagnosis of non-autonomy. My theory again avoids this implication, because it relies on the informed endorsement of the agent, rather than demanding that a pro-attitude have an origin that is somehow external to socialisation. We can thus assess Julie's autonomy according to how well she meets the five dimensions outlined above, without worrying about the origin of her reflective capacities.
The This raises the important the important question of whether the dimension of knowledgeof-the-world that I have put forward includes normative facts. For instance, if Meredith falsely believes that breast implants enhance a woman's self-worth, or that they bear no relation to patriarchy, does this mean her autonomy is compromised? 43 At the risk of sounding the same old refrain, the answer is going to be -yet again -that it depends. If
Meredith has a background commitment to opposing patriarchal norms, or even a more 43 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for pushing me on this point.
abstract commitment to acting in accordance with just principles, then being mistaken about the patriarchal nature of breast implants will compromise her autonomy. In such a case, her actions would come apart one of her deep commitments. We could imagine a Meredith, though, who was not committed to any of these things. In such a case, the mistaken normative belief would not affect her ability to act in accordance with her motivational attitudes, and thus would leave her autonomy unscathed. The account that I have presented defines autonomy in terms of five distinct dimensions:
knowledge-of-the-world, self-knowledge, self-definition, internal self-realisation and external self-realisation. This framework provides a principled way for distinguishing autonomy-supporting from autonomy-compromising autonomy: insofar as socialisation reduces the level of one or more dimension of autonomy, over one or more domains of human life, then it is autonomy-compromising. Such an account, I suggest, holds out the best hope of satisfactorily resolving the problem of socialisation.
